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Abstract: Loan programs in two different countries, Israel and Jamaica, are
compared and contrasted, in order to identify common elements of project
design, selection, and institutional norms. Utilizing agency theory, this article examines what types of borrowers successfully navigate the credit market and to what extent the bureaucratic processes employed by institutions
influence and bias outcomes in unpredicted ways in organizations.
Entrepreneurs are well recognized as coming from a wide range of backgrounds; indeed, it is the very heterogeneity of their origins that allows
many to provide the newness of perspective so necessary for their activities.
However, hidden or tacit institutional biases were found to work against
this diversity, limiting severely the impact of efforts to sustain an entrepreneurial culture and to promote economic development.
The characteristics of the lowest level of organizational actor(s) were
found to differentiate successful innovation from unsuccessful attempts.
Selection of the appropriate staff was found not only to influence the qual-
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ity and nature of the tasks assigned, but also the very direction and choice as
to exactly what the organization would do.

Introduction
The role of small scale industries in providing employment has increasingly become of concern to policy makers, donors, and researchers.
Millions of people in developing countries produce a wide variety of
goods and services, often operating out of makeshift locations and under
severe resource constraints. Financial services to support these micro and
small businesses are becoming the preferred point of support throughout
the developing and developed world.

GEMINI

(Growth and Equity

through Microenterprise Investments and Institutions),
Grameen Bank, and
NGO s

PRODEM ,

ACCION ,

the

represent just a few of the better known

(non-governmental organizations) engaged in such lending activi-

ties (Hossain, 1988; Lycette & White, 1989; Rhyne & Otero, 1994).
While lending activities have proliferated, research regarding both the
outcomes and the processes has been quite limited. Evaluating the influence of credit on various businesses is extremely hard to assess—imputing how much of one firm’s success can be attributed to financial
resources, as opposed to entrepreneurial capabilities, market conditions,
and other factors, is, at best, a dubious proposition. Most

NGO s

are

obliged to report their comparative success in terms of default data; high
repayment rates are considered a success, low rates a failure. While this
information is useful to bilateral and multilateral donors, it fails to assess
a number of more critical dimensions, particularly which firms are
helped and how they are chosen. This is the research gap that this article will examine.

Benson Honig is currently a lecturer at the University of Haifa, Israel and affiliated with
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Background and Theoretical Framework
Consultants, community development agents, and managers are frequently charged with the objective of implementing new programs
across widely different cultural landscapes. In doing so, they face formidable obstacles in ascertaining programmatic quality and consistency
throughout their organizations. Like the game “telephone line” many of
us played as children, ideas that seem clear and succinct at the top of the
organizational hierarchy become incomprehensible once they diffuse to
the field. Multiple interpretations by employees of the goals emitted
from the funding source or top of an organizational hierarchy undermine the potential for rational planned outcomes that reflect the unique
environmental qualities of each particular situation. One further complication is that organizations use very different approaches to decision
making. Managers at the top of the hierarchy who have a clear line of
access to relevant field-level information maintain a distinct advantage
over the competition—as do those with greater levels of trust in their
subordinates.
While institutional theory suggests that much of what organizations
do is shrouded in ceremony and myth (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), limited
efforts are typically made regarding understanding the source or root of
such institutional norms and values. Turning the organizational hierarchy upside down, I propose in this article that the employees of organizations determine goals that are subsequently legitimized or
reconstructed by authority figures. In order to illustrate this assertion, let
us turn to examples of organizations that work across wide cultural
chasms.
The World Bank and many bilateral agencies, such as

USAID ,

are lead-

ers in promoting and diffusing a wide range of development programs
focused on small enterprise promotion and support, primarily in less
developed countries ( LDC s). For many obvious and well-heralded rea94
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sons, bilateral and multilateral donors have a vested interest in ensuring
that markets remain open, tariff and trade barriers reduced, and subsidies are eliminated. Supporting new and small businesses is often linked
to these ubiquitous policies.
Historically, many developing countries have favored erecting protectionist market mechanisms, such as import substitution, in order to nurture specific industries, including many small businesses. As monetary
and financial policies in LDC s increasingly move toward normative world
practices promoting competitive conditions, many small businesses and
subsectors have fallen victim to radical environmental changes over
which they have little or no control. Not only do

LDC s

exhibit such

swings, but so do small businesses in blighted urban areas of many developed country cities. “White flight” and the exodus of the middle class,
industry, and accompanied service and retail facilities often render them
susceptible to exogenous factors out of their control. To help ameliorate
some of these conditions, considerable efforts continue to be made to
assist small businesses in economically depressed environments. Wellknown examples include the Grameen Bank’s work in Bangladesh,
ACCION

in Latin America, multiple efforts in Eastern Europe and Africa,

as well as the Small Business Administration ( SBA ) and other regional
organizations in urban areas of the United States.
One very popular method of mitigation is to provide targeted assistance toward employment generation and small business adaptation
schemes. Indeed, the World Bank proudly proclaims that they have provided many millions of dollars to microbusinesses, and

USAID ,

likewise

(under specific direction from Congress) claims to have provided considerable sums to small businesses, while the

SBA

in the United States

had US$15 billion outstanding in over 100,000 loans to small businesses
in 1993.
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Worldwide, the two most common forms of assistance include small
business/entrepreneurial training programs and microlending, of which
the latter is the most prevalent. Small loans are popular for three main
reasons:
1.

They are fairly easy to monitor, in terms of distribution and default
rates.

2.

They are thought to require limited overhead and staff
support.

3.

They fulfill a specific need often mentioned by small business persons; namely the limited availability of capital from the traditional
banking institutions, who are otherwise inattentive to small and
microbusinesses and their financial requirements.
In the 1990s, targeted assistance was rarely a strict bilateral arrange-

ment. As with many private and government organizations that have
delayered and now out-source much of their noncritical activities, the
aid industry increasingly relies upon outside contractors to perform the
“nuts and bolts” of day-to-day operation in the field.
The development industry itself relies upon armies of consultants who
are recruited on an ad hoc basis, sometimes taken from larger organizations that can no longer justify their overhead. Behind the rather large
sums of money dedicated to small business development are consulting
firms (sometimes referred to as “beltway bandits” in Washington, D.C.)
located in capitol cities throughout the developing and developed world.
Each agency caters toward a number of constituencies, each representing
a requisite number of experts as well as policy makers with individual
and collective agendas that may diverge from the economic criteria or
from the donor at large (Hancock, 1989). Included are issues that may
exist far afield of general business promotion, such as factors relating to
gender, class, ethnicity, mobility, democracy, education, and free-market
capitalism.
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Once consultants have been identified through competitive bidding on
the part of agencies, they are frequently sent to work with NGO s and with
governments. These institutions exist with histories of their own—separate and unique from that of the donors and

consulting agencies.

Depending on their organizational cultures, they, too, focus on issues
tangential to general business promotion, including factors relating to
political partisanship, regional politics, gender, ethnicity, class, mobility,
democracy, education, and free-market capitalism, to name but a few.
Finally, at the lowest level—at the point of contact between the aforementioned donors and agencies, and the actual client—exists the actor
or development agent, whose role might be further defined as a trainer,
educator, loan agent, representative, or program director. While the governance and bureaucratic nature of an organization may be determined
by their historic development, or by governmental regulation, development agents are often in a pivotal position to affect outcomes due to individual bias and preferences. In many developing countries, actors may be
governed by reciprocity, as characterized by personal market exchange,
rather than by impersonal markets (Plattner, 1985). Relationships are
long term, open-ended, and governed by noninstrumental components.
Asymmetrical and imperfect information, as well as weak legal protection, contribute to this characteristic, as loan agents know little of the
backgrounds of the people they assist, and they have limited enforcement
mechanisms (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).
At the micro level, self-categorization theory provides a useful psychological framework for understanding relationships that evolve between
the various actors. Individuals attempting to maintain high self-esteem
are said to identify themselves into in categories such as age, race, status,
and religion (Turner, 1987). For example, one study demonstrated that
in-group members consider out-group members as less trustworthy and
less honest (Brewer, 1979). From an individual standpoint, attributes of
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the organizational members at the “point of contact” will have a significant influence on the character of the clientele, regardless of the organizational structure or its governance. In situations where information is
lacking and results are stringently adhered to, developing biases in favor
of clients that resemble the development agent may be a useful survival
strategy.

Theoretical Perspective:
The Organization in Combat
Collective members of organizations typically set goals, make decisions,
and implement strategies. The character, conditions, and methods of
these processes continue to be hotly contested in the literature, which
acknowledges the limited rationality of actors constrained by numerous
variables forced to make decisions in a limited time frame (Simon, 1957;
Steinbruner, 1974). In addition, international dimensions, resulting
from the incorporation of actors representing various cultural and
nationalistic perspectives, further compound organizational complexity
(Hambrick, et al., 1998; Hofstede, 1980; Boyacigiller & Adler, 1991);
however, space limitations prohibit an adequate discussion in this article.
To understand organizational decision-making from a more pragmatic
perspective, let us move to a very constrained and structured organizational process: consider a military operation during the heat of battle. At
the start of a war, commanding generals are typically in clear communication and control of their troops. They carefully lay down specific goals
and objectives: “Take this territory,” “Break through defenses here,”
“Proceed to this point,” etc. As the war progresses, communication
becomes disorganized, infrequent, and increasingly incomprehensible
between the field and headquarters. Reporting becomes sporadic, the big
picture appears quite fuzzy, and the original goals and objectives
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increasingly appear irrelevant, as the enemy reacts to the situation at
hand and changes their position in real time.
In the field, meanwhile, small units, controlled by individual actors,
are facing a barrage of stimuli possibly in direct contradiction to what
was specified they would face in the original operational plan. These
units have two alternatives: They can stick to orders, regardless of the
irrelevancy of the original plan, or they can form new objectives based on
the situation they now face. The first alternative, that of proceeding with
the original plan, may entail considerable risks. For instance, the movie
A Bridge Too Far, depicts British field officers during

WWII

refusing to

deviate from their initial plan, resulting in the unnecessary mass slaughter of their own troops. In marked contrast, acutely aware of the organizational hazards inherent in failing to adapt and modify plans, the
Israeli army learned to train and refine its troops to make battle-level
operational decisions “on the fly.” Such decisions are conducted at the
field level, sometimes conflicting with, other times directing, real time
operational plans at headquarters. This form of limited direction and
field-level innovation worked exceptionally well against the Egyptian
front in 1967, where, as one analyst reports, “Of the four days that the
campaign lasted, only the first was planned in any detail; the rest was
pure improvisation” (Van Creveld, 1985).
During the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, contradictory organizational goals,
combined with ineffective and inefficient decision making nearly
resulted in Israeli military failure. As Van Creveld (1985) summarizes,
“During the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, contradictory organizational goals,
combined with ineffective and inefficient decision making nearly
resulted in Israeli military failure.” He continues,
Instead of certainty being created by means of supervision from the
top downward, uncertainty spread from the bottom up . . . .
Deficiencies . . . included . . . a faulty command organization; a lack
of mutual trust among the senior commanders involved; incompre-
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hensible staff procedures; and the absence of a directed telescope to
supplement the flow of information from below by an active quest for
it from the top. Without exception, these deficiencies were organizational in nature. (p. 230)

As with the Israeli military, many

NGO s

maintain broad goals and

objectives and loose flexible command structures.

NGO s

in the small

business sector typically have formal mission statements that are quite
broad and nonspecific. These can be more or less summarized as “providing assistance to all worthy entrepreneurs and small businesses that
would otherwise have difficulty obtaining resources,” or something to
that effect.
Unlike military operations, where there is generally a winner, or private business, where there may be multiple winners (or losers),

NGO s

operate in an in-between dimension of political appeal, public policy,
and core values.
If we analyze the role of “bosses” (principals) and “workers” (agents)
we may conclude that nonprofit organizations will have greater
employee-shirking activity than for-profit firms (Alchian & Demsetz,
1972). This occurs because nonprofits have a characteristic separation
between management decision-making and control, in that managers
initiate activities that are implemented and monitored by others who
bear the risks. In addition, the consequences of improved management
cannot be capitalized for the benefit of shareholders (Fama & Jensen,
1983a; Fama & Jensen, 1983b). Thus, the failure to institute appropriate
monitoring procedures will be of even greater consequence with
than

NGO s

for-profit-

making organizations. From a military perspective, imagine generals
forced to hire mercenaries whose pay and performance are
determined by politicians, based on an array of potentially contradictory
goals and outcomes.
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The theoretical basis for the

NGO

comparison in this article utilizes

agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The director of an

NGO

is

essentially the agent of the bilateral or multilateral funding agency, who
serves as the principal, while, simultaneously, the director, acting as a
principal within his or her own organization, employs agents to carry out
the tasks of identifying, training, and approving clientele. Conflicts and
discontinuities arise when the interests of principals and agents diverge.
In this research, the organizations studied were primarily not-for-profit
institutions, further distorting the relationship between the two levels of
principals and agents—the donor community, and, within the organization, the internal management structure. As agency theory predicts that
nonprofit organizations will have greater shirking activity than for-profit
firms, the failure to institute appropriate monitoring procedures will be
of even greater consequence (Zimmerman, 1979). How can this be overcome?

Comparative Framework: Israel and Jamaica
In this analysis, loan programs in both Jamaica and Israel are compared
and contrasted. Minority microlending in both countries is quite limited,
allowing for a fairly representative and comprehensive comparative
analysis.
The Center for Jewish–Arab Economic Development has been operating a revolving loan fund for Israeli Arabs and Palestinian citizens of
Israel since 1991. It is the only one of its kind in Israel and was started to
provide opportunities for small business in the Arab sector, which commercial banks viewed as either too costly to evaluate or otherwise too
high a risk. The organization has focused on loans to small, innovative
Arab businesses that have little equipment or property to utilize as collateral. It has lent approximately US$650,000 to 26 businesses, with an
average loan size of US$25,000. The organization provides extensive
Volume 2 Number 1
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business and marketing training and maintains a very low default rate.
For this study, more than one-half (14) of the 26 firms that received loans
were interviewed at their locations in Israel. In addition, extensive interviews were conducted with each director and with individual loan
agents, regarding the goals and process of their lending activities. In
Israel, the owners of businesses in half of the loan portfolio were interviewed at their business location. An analysis was made of the portfolio
as to the relative affluence, need, educational criteria, and gender of the
clientele. Following the field study and analysis, a meeting was held with
all the principal employees and managers of the

NGO ,

and a survey

instrument translated into Hebrew was distributed.
In Jamaica, the unavailability of credit to the informal sector is frequently cited as a major impediment to the operation and growth of
small firms (Anderson, 1992; Dessing, 1990; Davies, Fisseha & Kirton,
1981; Lubell, 1991; Lycette & White, 1989; Statistical Institute of
Jamaica, 1993). Although theoretically there are several potential sources
of Jamaican credit, including banks, microenterprise lending agencies,
family, and informal credit arrangements (partnerships based on cooperative lending pools), the limited scope and availability of such monies for
Jamaican microentrepreneurs are widely acknowledged, and practical
alternatives are few (Anderson, 1992; Statistical Institute of Jamaica,
1993; Honig, 1998). This dearth of institutional credit has been recognized by bilateral and multilateral institutions such as the International
Labour Organization ( ILO ),

USAID ,

and the World Bank. Beginning in

the 1980s, they have undertaken to develop, promote, and support several credit institutions whose primary directive is to provide credit to
Jamaican microenterprise.
A commercial credit union, as well as four different
microloans in Jamaica, subsidized by

USAID ,

NGO s

provides

the Dutch and Canadian

governments, and other bilateral and multilateral agencies. As in the
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case of the Israeli

NGO ,

each organization was evaluated and interviews

were conducted with management, as well as the lending staff. Another
74 firms, randomly selected from the clientele fosters of all five microcredit agencies, were visited on site and interviewed. Loan portfolios of
the different institutions ranged from US$100,000 to US$2,000,000, and
average loan sizes ranged from US$600 to US$5,000. They had been in
existence from between 2 to10 years, and four of the organizations provided business and marketing training, as well as credit facilities.

Findings
The examination of the clientele of a number of

NGO s

in the two differ-

ent countries found individuals who did not match the broad organizational criteria of severely limited resource constraints. Many of their
clientele were found to be either individuals with considerable access to
alternative capital or those chosen by arbitrary criteria that failed to
match the overall organizational goals of access and meritocracy. In
Jamaica, for example, one firm was found to have borrowed a considerable sum ( US$150,000), despite its not meeting any objective criteria as
to size (this large factory had over 25 employees). Discussions with the
loan agent indicated that the firm was chosen because of the reliability
with which it could repay the loan, rather than on the criteria of need.
The owner of the firm had extensive working relationships with banks
and was utilizing the microloan program because his loan was subsidized at a below-market rate.
The Israeli

NGO

staff were found to be surprisingly ignorant of the

character of their own loan portfolio. For example, six of eight reporting
staff members (75%) thought that the average starting capital for the
businesses they lent to was under US$15,000, while the mean for the
sample was three times that figure (see Table 1). Four of seven reporting
staff members (42%) thought they were helping more women than men,
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despite a loan portfolio of 93% male entrepreneurs. Most significant,
seven of the eight staff members (87.5%) thought they were loaning to
individuals who had no other credit alternatives, while 53% of the firm
owners indicated that they had other credit alternatives but were using
the loan fund because it provided credit at comparatively favorable rates.

The NGO
The

NGO s

in Jamaica exhibited similar dissonance between stated goals

and empirical reality. A systematic comparison of the organizations’
clientele showed that they tended to rely upon specific strategies or specializations, without being institutionally aware of their biases. Marital
status, education, gender, and religiosity all appeared to be operating as
credit rationing devices for the different NGO s, but the rates of usage varied considerably (Honig, 1998). For example, one agency was found to
be lending substantial sums, well in excess of their official ceiling, to a
large successful manufacturing firm. The owner of the firm, a millionaire, admitted that his attraction to the organization was only to obtain
substantial credit at subsidized rates—he had many alternative sources,
including major banks. To supplement their portfolio, this

NGO

lent a

number of microloans to “model” firms, who were used as showcases
during the appropriate international forums and inspections. This strategy allowed them to gain a reasonably high assurance of repayment,
while also providing them with sufficient multilateral compliance, in the
form of their model firms.
As with the initial plans before entering combat, the

NGO s

in Jamaica

devised clear and explicit mission statements, charters, and business
plans. Evaluating this formal documentation and analyzing the interviews conducted with the managing directors demonstrated how similar
the formal stated organizational goals were between the different agencies. This was not too surprising, as there was considerable scope for
104

Volume 2 Number 1

Small Business Promotion and Microlending
interaction during joint inter-agency training programs conducted for
loan officers, as well as career movement by management between the
various organizations. For example, consider the following statements
from the managing directors of the agencies, when asked specifically
about their goals and objectives:
“The primary purpose is to provide . . . working capital and fixed assets
as well as any type of temporary assistance they would require in order
to start or upgrade [their microenterprise].”
“To equip people in the small and micro sector to come in ‘mainstream’ by offering financial and technical assistance.”
“To provide credit and to provide technical assistance . . . to the smaller
microentrepreneurial sector.”
“We are a credit agency . . . We see ourselves more as a [community]
developer.”
Thus, while the organizational literature provided by each of the five
agencies was remarkably similar, their practices were found to differ
widely. In most cases, relevant literature, policy statements, and even
applications could be freely exchanged between organizations with little
or no obvious impact or conflict. Despite their similarity, however, they
deviated widely from each other, and from their own organizational
goals. How did this come about?

Conclusion
Having carefully studied a number of microlending organizations in
both Jamaica and Israel, it became increasingly apparent that organizational objectives operating at different levels prevented institutions from
doing what they claim they had set out to do. Further, it became apparent that a “bottom-up” type of strategy was directing the activities of
these organizations, largely unbeknownst to the directors and managers.
This observation is likely to have parallels elsewhere, particularly in sitVolume 2 Number 1
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Table 1: Israeli NGO: Expectations Versus Reality
Expected
By agency personnel
Firm Owners who have
NO credit alternatives:

87.5%

47%

Number of employees
between 2–5

87.5%

Anticipated the correct percentage of
Firm Owners with a College
Education (25% to 50%)

62%

We help women more than men
Estimated Average Starting Capital
of US$15,000 or less

Actual
Reported by owners

42%

75%

61%

29% had a college
degree
93% male clientele

59% had starting
capital over US$15,000;
mean of US$40,000

uations that result in multiple and conflicting goal designations. For
example, transnational firms set goals at the macro organizational level.
These goals may conflict with regional or local objectives and may also
contradict individual managerial or employee incentives and wishes.
This competition between mutually exclusive objectives invariably leaves
the employee in the “driver’s seat” regarding which way to navigate the
resulting confusion. The outcome is not necessarily beneficial.
Studying the process by which these monies are distributed is critical
to understanding how goals and objectives are redirected and it may
prove illustrative to many other organizations. Examining decision-making processes in both Israel and Jamaica suggests that too little attention
is placed on the character of the implementing actors—the employees
themselves. An extensive body of literature exists studying the nature of
leaders, leadership selection, organizational culture, methodologies, and
processes. While leaders themselves tinker with new methods of com106
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munication, incentives, and organizational structures, this article argues
that it is the character of the lowest level of organizational actor(s) that
differentiates successful innovation from unsuccessful attempts.
Selection of appropriate staff thus influences not only the quality and
nature of the tasks assigned but also the very direction and choice as to
what exactly will be done. This is particularly true when goals and
objectives are either vague or in conflict with other incentives or individual predilections.
In contrast to what usually occurs, foreign donors often require their
principals (managers, representatives, consultants, etc.) to avoid selection criteria on the basis of financial or embedded relations. Such
requirements are in place in an attempt to maximize the potential for
economic development and avoid accusations of partisanship or nepotism. The

NGO

managers are thus left in a quandary—how to maintain

low default rates, which are carefully monitored, while lending to individuals for whom they have little information. This research suggests
that the dilemma was solved as managers provided their loan agents significant leeway in the decision-making process. The loan agents, acting
without extensive monitoring and control procedures, characteristically
relied upon informal networks, signaling, and in-group characteristics in
order to identify reliable clientele. As a result, the organizations tended
to conform to a selection process focusing on specific indicators targeted
by the loan agents, rather than by the principals and donors. In some
cases education was found to be crucial; in others, religiosity was a more
important selection mechanism, each presenting an organizationally
viable, if somewhat subversive, element to the decision-making process.
This suggests a relationship between the tacit, or undisclosed, criteria
and the organizational goals and objectives, even when those goals and
objectives are not explicitly defined or codified. In these cases, in-group
affiliation may be the most salient governing process.
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Such decision-making biases, if left unchecked, are certain to have significant long-range outcomes that may even undermine the very activity
supported by these institutions. Entrepreneurs are well recognized as
coming from a wide range of backgrounds—indeed, it is the very heterogeneity of their origins that allows many to provide the newness of
perspective so necessary for their activities. Hidden or tacit institutional
biases may work against this diversity, limiting severely the impact of
efforts to sustain an entrepreneurial culture and to promote economic
development.
Microenterprise credit agencies would be well advised to pay careful
attention to the characteristics of their loan agents on a range of dimensions including gender, education, social capital, Socio-Economic
Status, and religiosity. Devising monitoring and incentive systems that
closely parallel the objectives of the organization are particularly important and appear to have been absent in the case of the many

NGO s

stud-

ied. Failure to introduce new systems may undermine the targeted goals
of microlending, while attention to these details should result in greater
overall efficiency and programmatic consistency.
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